Memorandum of democratic voting procedures in electing an
ordered list of candidates.

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The proposals below have relevance to the election of the
alternate members of the National Committee.

There are three categories on the National Committee; Advisory
members, with consultative vote; full members, with decisive vote;
alternate members, with consultative vote. Full members and
Advisoary members are not ranked in any way. The election procedure
for electing the full ~~members~~ and advisory members ~~occur~~ by a usually works easily,
simply vote, majority decides. secret ballot, The alternates , however, are
ranked in order. The reason for this is that ~~————————~~
if a full member of the National Committee drops off ~~————~~ the
Committee for some reason in between conventions, he or she is
replaced by ~~————————~~ the highest alternate. Ranking of alternates
is therefore necessary for replacement purposes.

Thus, not only is a list of ~~the~~ alternate members of the
National Committee elected, but this list is an ordered list.
fraught with complications. The
The election of an ordered list is ~~————————————~~
simple method of voting and counting that is often ~~——~~ practiced
~~————————————————————————————~~
is such that a small minority of voters can often change the
ranking of the alternates, and even the composition of the alternate
list itself. For example, ~~————~~ in the usual simple voting and
counting procedure, 2 voters of a total of 40 can put onto the elected
alternate list a candidate rejected by the other 38 voters.

A. Simple method of voting and counting.

The most widely used method of electing an ordered list is very simple:

A first place vote counts for one point

A second place vote counts for two points

A third place vote counts for three points

etc.

The candidate to receive the <u>lowest</u> number of points is elected to first place on the elected list; the one to receive the next lowest number of points is elected second, etc.

Under normal circumstances, when a slate is presented, most of the voters will vote similarly and the difference between any two consecutive places on the elected list will be one point for each voter. If 100 people vote, the difference between the candidate elected to position ten and the candidate elected to position eleven will be 100 points (1000 to 1100). If the voters do not tend to follow the proposed slate, then the differences between consecutive positions will vary, some (perhaps even the order will change) more than 100 points and some less, but the average difference will still be 100.

What if there are 20 positions to fill on the alternate list, and there are more than 20 candidates? Let us assume that there are 21 candidates. Normally, the highly favored candidate and the less-favored for place 20 will receive 2000 points, candidate for this place will receive 2100 points , under the assumption that 100 people are voting.

however, There are "trick" tactics that can be employed by a small minority of only five people that will result in

eliminating from the elected list the candidate favored by the
vast majority, and electing instead the candidate favored by only
five. These five people can effectively shift 100 points of the
vote in a simple voting system. (In general, if there are n places
to fill, then 1/n of the delegates can effect such a shift).

This can be done, under some circumstances by "bullet
balloting," The unfair effects of bullet balloting, however,
can be easily avoided. There is another trick method of voting,
"reverse-order voting", which is more difficult to counter; it
can be countered, but not in a satisfactory manner. What is
required is a different method of voting and counting.

B. Bullet Balloting

Bullet balloting is voting for fewer candidates than
the total list to be elected. This method of voting is
justified by its adherents on the grounds that there may be
some candidates that they cannot vote for in good conscience.
They maintain that they should not be forced to vote for candidates
they cannot support, even though there may not be enough other
nominations to fill out the full list on their ballots.

In practice, however, if the system of counting votes is
faulty, bullet balloting can be used in a trick way by a small minority to give
disproportionately heavy weight to one (or a few) candidate(s)
of their choice.

A faulty system of counting the votes can occur as follows:
if there are 20 places to fill and 21 candidates, giving one
point to a first place vote, two points to a second place vote;
n points to an nth place vote; and 21 points to all those not

voted for.   Under this faulty system, if 1/20 of the voters bullet
ballot a first place **f**ote for one candidate, they will probably
shift this candidate up one place on the list; or they can elect
a candidate to the slate and eliminate the lowest candidate favored
by the other ████ ~~of~~ the ████ voters.   *95%*

For example: Assume there are 100 voters. If candidate A
is the overwhelming choice for place 20, and candidate B is the
overwhelming choice for place 21, then--   *(not elected)*

A will receive ████ about (100)(20) = 2000 points

B will receive   about (100)(21) = 2100 points

But, if 5 people bullet ballot for candidate B as their
first choice and vote for no other candidates, then B will
receive one point from each of these five, and all other candidates
will receive 21 points. This will not affect the other candidates,
except for candidate A, ████ Under this system, --

A will receive about (95)(20) + (5)(21) = 2005 points

B will receive about (95)(21) + (5)(1) = 2000 points

and B will be elected to the National Committee instead of A, as
a result of bullet balloting by only five people out of 100.

This problem can be easily avoided by instituting a fairer
method of counting the votes, as follows: if a voter votes for
only n candidates, they will receive 1,2,3,...n points consecutively,
and all candidates not voted for will receive n+1 points. If only
one candidate is voted for, that candidate will receive 1 point, and
all other candidates will receive 2 points. Thus, in the example
above, even with bullet balloting --

A will receive (95)(20) + (5)(2) = 1910 points

B will receive (95)(21) + (5)(1) = 2000 points

resulting in no change. It would require a majority of half the
voters to ████ change the *alternate* membership on the *elected* National Committee.

It can be seen, therefore, that bullet balloting offers no serious problem. It can be permitted, for those who wish to vote for less than the full list, but it cannot be used effectively in a trick manner.

C. Reverse Order Voting

There is no way to prevent this method of voting. It is very effective. Its effects can be offset, but only by counter-tricks which set an undesirable tone

Reverse-order voting works as follows. Assume that 5 voters out of 100 want to move candidate B from the non-elected position 21 to the elected position 20 in place of candidate A, who is the choice of the other 95 voters for position 20.

These 5 voters could vote for B in first place, for 19 other candidates, and for A in 21st place. Then--

A would receive (95)(20) + (5)(21) = 2005 points

B would receive (95)(21) + (5)(1) = 2000 points

and B would be elected to the National Committee in place of A. No bullet balloting is required; and this occurs even under the fairer system of counting votes explained in the previous page. A very small minority of voters can alter the list of alternates that the vast majority want to be elected.

However, this trick can also be countered as follows: Another group of 5 voters would do the reverse. They would vote for candidate A in first place and for candidate B in 21st place, and for the other candidates as they

saw fit ~~_____~~ (it wouldn't matter ordinarily). The result would

be as follows:

> A would receive $(90)(20) + (5)(1) + (5)(21) = 1910$ points
>
> B would receive $(95)(21) + \qquad (5)(1) = 2000$ points

and the trick of the 5 would ~~__~~ come to naught.

(Note: in this particular case, one ~~_____~~ "defender" could vote in the above fashion and counter the effect of the five "tricksters" ; A would receive 1986 and B would receive 2000, and A would still be elected. In general, if ~~_____~~ n places to (= the number of) fill; if V=total voters; if T= tricksters; and D= defenders, then D need only be/larger than $(T-V/n)$ in order/to counter the tricks *for the defenders* of the tricksters.)

The drawback of this counter-measure is that ~~__~~ it requires prior consultation among the "defenders". And, if the "trickster" minority element is larger, it will require larger and more organized consultation among the "defenders" in order to avoid upsetting the desired order of the other candidates. This tends to ~~__~~ set a bad tone and cut across the goal of a free ballot.

D. A different Method of Counting the Votes

The unfair results of reverse-order voting can best be prevented by instituting a different, fairer method of counting votes.

There are several possible methods. Some need involve still only one ballot. The system used in proportional representation voting is good, but it is probably impractical because it is very time-consuming to count. Another system can also use one ballot, but with each ballot counted twice; first ~~without regard to rank, to determine the composition~~ without regard to rank, to determine the composition of the alternate list (generally every candidate elected will have to receive votes from a majority; there is the unlikely possibility of run-offs); then counting as valid only the votes for those elected, the same ballots can be used to tally the total points in order to find out the ranking. This is rather complicated to explain, and if not fully understood it might seem unfair (for example, candidate A with $(95)(20) + (5)(21)c= 2005$ points would be elected, while candidate B with $(95)(21) + (5)(1) = 2000$ points would not be elected, because B would have been eliminated in the first round of counting.)

The easiest way to have a fair vote is to take two votes. The first vote would be to determine the composition of the alternate list, without regard to rank. After that is determined, another vote would be taken to determine the ranking only. Bullet balloting would still be allowed, in both votes, but votes would be counted according to the fair system described in the section above under bullet balloting.

Under this system, a small minority would still be able to alter ███ slightly the ranking of the alternate list. But they would not be able to change the composition of the National Committee itself.